In this work, I analyze our concept of cause in the face of criticism of Bertrand Russell in his article “On the Notion of Cause”. For Russell, there is an estrangement between the notion of cause and mature science of physics. The word cause (and its correlates) would not be used in physics, thus eliminating the main justification of philosophy for his job—the foundation of science. Thus, the various causal notions and the principle of causality should be abandoned by philosophers (...) as something outdated. The aim of this study is to assess the extent to which our notion of cause, with its asymmetric nature, can be explained by physics and investigate the question of the existence of causes in our world. (shrink)

This paper examines the asymmetrical aspect of causal relation, confronting it to Humean and Neo-Humean's view. Following Hausman and Ehring, we favor a situational approach to causal asymmetry. We explore the Hausman's analysis of flagpole's example, clearing the connexions between causation and explanation. Our general diagnosis is that the Neo-humean tradition wrongly supposes that nomic relations, with the exception of minor details, exhaust the causal relations.

A obra de Suely Rolnik traz para o debate filosófico contemporâneo a possibilidade de pensar os dias de hoje a partir de conceitos psicanalíticos e filosóficos. O livro em si não trata especificamente a área da educação, mas o fio condutor criado pela autora, o que ela denomina de descolonização do inconsciente, bem como a prática micropolítica que se dá sobre os processos de subjetivação e os demais conceitos apresentados: pulsão, linguagem, desejo, imaginação, criação, afetos e outros; são absolutamente relevantes (...) para a propositura de uma educação revolucionária e contemporânea. (shrink)

O texto aborda a política e gestão da formação de professores no Brasil na perspectiva da filosofia da práxis. Resulta de pesquisa sobre a formação de professores na tensão entre as dimensões econômico-corporativa e ético-política” e tem por objetivo explicitar alguns dos fundamentos da política/gestão da formação dos professores na dimensão substantiva/ético-política. O estudo utiliza-se das pesquisas bibliográfica e empírico/documental e ancora-se na abordagem materialista e crítico-dialética para interpelar a existência teórico-prática da ótica formativa emancipadora fundamentada nos princípios ético-políticos e (...) da filosofia da práxis e seus impactos para o trabalho docente. A pesquisa revelou que a formação de professores no Brasil, tendencialmente, relegou a segundo plano a dimensão político-cultural, no entanto, a instrumentalização da formação, predominante no país, não ocorreu de forma linear e sem a disputa por uma formação de professores em um prisma substantivo, libertário e emancipador, expresso no trabalho docente em espaço formativo.__. (shrink)

Why is space 3-dimensional? The fi rst answer to this question, entirely based on Physics, was given by Ehrenfest, in 1917, who showed that the stability requirement for n-dimensional two-body planetary system very strongly constrains space dimensionality, favouring 3-d. This kind of approach will be generically called "stability postulate" throughout this paper and was shown by Tangherlini, in 1963, to be still valid in the framework of general relativity as well as for quantum mechanical hydrogen atom, giving the same constraint (...) for space{dimensionality. In the present work, before criticizing this methodology, a brief discussion has been introduced, aimed at stressing and clarifying some general physical aspects of the problem of how to determine the number of space dimensions. Then, the epistemological consequences of Ehrenfest's methodology are critically reviewed. An alternative procedure to get at the proper number of dimensions, in which the stability postulate - and the implicit singularities in three-dimensional physics - are not an essential part of the argument, is proposed. In this way, the main epistemological problems contained in Ehrenfest's original idea are avoided. The alternative methodology proposed in this paper is realized by obtaining and discussing the n-dimensional quantum theory as expressed in Planck's law, de Broglie relation and the Heisenberg uncertainty relation. As a consequence, it is possible to propose an experiment, based on thermal neutron di raction by crystals, to directly measure space dimensionality. Finally the distinguished role of Maxwell's electromagnetic theory in the determination of space dimensionality is stressed. (shrink)

Metascientific criteria used for explaining or constraining physical space dimensionality and their historical relationship to prevailing causal systems are discussed. The important contributions by Aristotle, Kant and Ehrenfest to the dimensionality of space problem are considered and shown to be grounded on different causal explanations: causa materialis for Aristotle, causa efficiens for young Kant and an ingenious combination of causa efficiens and causa formalis for Ehrenfest. The prominent and growing rôle played by causa formalis in modern physical approaches to this (...) problem is emphasized. (shrink)

Music and affects share a long history. In recent times, 4E cognitive sciences (embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended), situated affectivity, and related ecological theoretical frameworks have been conceptualizing music as a case of a tool for feeling. Drawing on this debate, I propose to further theorize the role of music in situating our affectivity by analyzing how the very affective affordances of music are technologically situated. In other words, I propose to shift the attention from music as a tool for (...) feeling to the tools for feeling music. I argue that the experience of music as a tool for feeling may be altered, enhanced, or lessened depending on the tools for feeling music. I investigate the extent to which AI might be a case of a tool for feeling music and examine the influence it could exert over musical affectivity. I conclude that AI can be considered a tool for feeling music of curatorial type and that the limitations and/or biases of AI as a method risk lessening the power of musical affective affordances. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to show that it’s a serious mistake to construe the role of sensible representation in Kant’s work as a nonconceptual content (in the contemporary and technical sense of “content”), which, like a mental indexical would refer to what appears in space and time in the so-called de re form. The interpretation I advance and further support is this: without possessing a representational content, sensible representation must be understood as the basic epistemic relation between the subject (...) and the physical entities in space and time she is acquainted with. Immediate reference of sensible intuition to their respective objects is to be understood as a form of knowledge by acquaintance. I call my own interpretation relationalism. (shrink)

I argue that my non-dual epistemic-phenomenalist view is the one that best harmonises my interpretation of the Fourth Paralogism with the widely shared reading of the Refutation of Idealism that I sketched and defended above. The bottom line of my view is a clear distinction between the metaphysical and epistemological sides of Kantian idealism. Again, according to my non-dual-epistemic-phenomenalism, the mundus sensibilis and mundus intelligibilis are epistemologically distinct ways of considering the metaphysically identical outside world. Appearances are nothing but the (...) way the things in themselves appear or exist inside our sensible minds as mere representations. In this sense, I reject both the two-world view, the two-aspect view, and Allais’s deflationary anti- phenomenalist reading. (shrink)

We set forth what one may call a “constitutional reading” in opposition to the traditional widespread “constructivist reading” of the object of cognition. In the light of the so-called one-object view reading of Transcendental idealism, the object of cognition is nothing but the object that exists in itself insofar as it appears to our cognitive apparatus. The object exists mind-independently, while our cognition of the same object must be mind-independent. The constructivist reading mistakes the epistemological problem of how we come (...) to cognize mind-dependently that what we represent (“the constitutional view”) are mind-independent objects with the Berkelian ontological problem of how we construct objects out of an undifferentiated, unstructured manifold (the constructivist view) My diagnosis is as follows. The first reason is the traditional “two-worlds view” reading of Kant’s idealism. If we take what exists in itself and the object of cognition as distinct things, then we must conclude that the object of cognition is a mind-dependent construction. Constructivist readers mistake the mind-dependent nature of our human cognition of objects for the putative mind-dependent nature of the known object. The second reason is overintellectualization. Constructivist readers mistake the objectifying syntheses of the imagination, below the threshold of self-consciousness, for cognitive conceptual operations by means of which we cognize (erkennen) the objects of cognition, or so I shall argue. (shrink)

This article presents a dual purpose: to carefully consider objections against the existentialist conception of the content of visual experience and to develop and defend a version of it that avoids such objections, specifically addressing the so-called "problem of particularity." The main thesis is that the existential content of visual experience should be understood as relativized, being incomplete content (rather than classical, complete propositions), modeled as a function of the sextuple of the object, agent, time, place, causal relation, and world (...) to absolute values. (shrink)

In this critical review of Robert Hanna's ingenious book (2006), I aim to support Hanna‟s main insightful reading of Kant, namely what he calls “a priori truth with a human face," without appealing to Kant's divide between a priori and a posteriori and analytic and synthetic truths. My suggestion is that transcendental propositions are necessary neither in the usual epistemological sense that analytic propositions are, let alone in the metaphysical sense that some empirical propositions are. Instead, they are necessary in (...) the theoretical domain in the weak alternative sense that they make possible the empirical recognition of appearances as an object as an indispensable condition of our self-consciousness experience, and they are a priori in the practical domain in the sense that their truth is vital for our self-comprehension as human beings. (shrink)

The idea that what we perceive are tropes (abstract particulars) is anything but new. In fact, it was one of the reasons why the ontology of tropes was postulated in the first place. Still, the claim that we perceive tropes is invariably and purely based on pre-philosophical intuitions or, indirectly, as a supporting argument for the advantages of the content view when compared to the relational view of experience. In this paper, I take the content view for granted and argue (...) in favor of what is herein referred to as the trope-content view of experience. My defense is a case of inference to the best explanation. The trope-content view can meet all reasonable desiderata on the experience and its content without assuming gaps or making the ad hoc assumption that there are different layers of content, or so shall I argue. (shrink)

Resumo: A proposta do trabalho é analisar a história da separação dos campos conceituais de cunho epistemológico daqueles de cunho axiológico durante o final da idade moderna e sua recepção crítica na contemporaneidade. A extensão do tema implica cortes metodológicos para viabilizar a execução da pesquisa e estes resultam na escolha de dois filósofos relevantes e interligados: Immanuel Kant como representante do final da modernidade e cujo pensamento fundamenta a perspectiva contemporânea sobre a relação entre ciência e moralidade; e Martin (...) Heidegger, pensador contemporâneo, profundo leitor e crítico da obra kantiana bem como de sua recepção no início do século XX. A trajetória percorrida no texto explora os aspectos da epistemologia kantiana como articulação simétrica de sua moralidade, porém em um campo de decidibilidade sobre teorias. A moralidade por sua vez implica uma fundamentação prática que extrapola o paradigma de decidibilidade em favor de um pragmatismo de fundamentação metafisica. A leitura heideggeriana explora a construção desta simetria através da pretensa insuficiência do pilar conceitual dos dois campos: a subjetividade. A tentativa heideggeriana coloca a necessidade de pensar radicalmente o lugar do sujeito, tanto do conhecimento quanto da ação. A apresentação do problema de cisão entre epistemologia e axiologia em Kant e a proposta heideggeriana de re-união dos campos epistemológico e axiológico numa raiz originária de cunho ontológico é a trajetória que se busca explanar e analisar neste trabalho. (shrink)

Resumo: A atuação do tradutor e intérprete de língua de sinais no contexto educacional inclusivo é tema de constantes embates teóricos acerca da concepção de seu ‘papel’. Desse modo, verificam-se prescrições que delimitam suas práticas e atribuições pela caracterização de uma pretensa ‘identidade’ profissional. Na contramão disso, esse estudo tenciona um adensamento analítico acerca daquilo que é produzido na atividade interpretativo-pedagógica do intérprete educacional, fora do âmbito da ‘identidade profissional’, mas no âmbito das efetivas ações produzidas pela posição e contextos (...) de ensino, assumidos na prática cotidiana. Assim, entende-se que essa função interpretativa se constitui na lógica da ‘diferença’, pela ativação relacional e pedagógica com o sujeito surdo no contexto escolar. A tese empreendida é a de que a função pedagógica do intérprete educacional é estabelecida como efeito do ato educativo. Nosso foco se dará na análise do aprender surdo e sua co-construção de conhecimento, produzidos com e pelos signos emitidos pelo intérprete educacional como efeito do acontecimento educativo. Portanto, cabe neste artigo, analisar o movimento conceitual da posição-mestre a partir dos estudos da hermenêutica do sujeito, em Michel Foucault, sendo ela articuladora da função interpretativo-pedagógica do intérprete educacional que se materializa no e pelo contexto de ensino. Palavras-chave: Intérprete educacional; Libras; Posição-mestre. The role of the educational interpreter and deaf learning: an analysis of the master position in the educational relationship in an inclusive classroom Abstract: Sign language translators and interpreter’s part within inclusive education constantly rises theoretical debates about the conception of their 'role'. Thus, we commonly see prescriptions that delimit their practices and attributions by characterizing a supposed professional "identity". Nevertheless, this study aims to analyze what is produced in the interpretive-pedagogical activity of the educational interpreter, beyond the scope of 'professional identity', and within the effective actions produced by the position and context assumed on a daily basis. Thus, we understand that this interpretative function is constituted in the logic of 'difference', by relational and pedagogical activation with the deaf subject in the school context. The thesis undertaken is that the pedagogical function of the educational interpreter is established as an effect of the educational act. We focus on the analysis of deaf learning and its co-construction of knowledge, produced with and by the signs emitted by the educational interpreter as an effect of the educational event. Therefore, this article analyzes the conceptual movement of the master position from the studies of the hermeneutics of the subject, in Michel Foucault, assuming it as an articulator of the interpretative-pedagogical function of the educational interpreter that materializes in and through the teaching context. Keywords: Educational interpreter; Libras; Master position. El papel del intérprete educativo y el aprendizaje de los sordos: un análisis de la posición del maestro en la relación educativa en un aula inclusiva Resumen: El papel de los traductores e intérpretes de lengua de señas en la educación inclusiva suscita constantemente debates teóricos sobre la concepción de su "papel". Es habitual ver prescripciones que delimitan sus prácticas y atribuciones caracterizando una supuesta "identidad" profesional. Sin embargo, este estudio pretende analizar lo que se produce en la actividad interpretativa-pedagógica del intérprete educativo, más allá del ámbito de la "identidad profesional", y dentro de las acciones efectivas producidas por la posición y el contexto asumidos cotidianamente. Así, entendemos que esta función interpretativa se constituye en la lógica de la 'diferencia', por la activación relacional y pedagógica con el sujeto sordo en el contexto escolar. La tesis es que la función pedagógica del intérprete educativo se establece como efecto del acto educativo. Nos centramos en el análisis del aprendizaje de los sordos y su co-construcción del conocimiento, producido con y por los signos emitidos por el intérprete educativo como efecto del acto educativo. Para esto, este artículo analiza el movimiento conceptual de la posición de maestro desde los estudios de la hermenéutica del sujeto, en Michel Foucault, asumiéndola como articuladora de la función interpretativa-pedagógica del intérprete educativo que se materializa en y a través del contexto docente. Palabras clave: Intérprete educativo; Libras; Puesto de maestro. Data de registro: 06/07/2022 Data de aceite: 26/10/2022. (shrink)

Slavoj Žižek is known for quoting with the same enthusiasm the main names of Western Philosophy and the classics of pop culture, cinema, literature, and music. Therefore, in such rich theoretical framework, it is possible to glimpse a few connections that the philosopher himself has not yet developed in detail. This essay is precisely about of these connections. More specifically, this essay can be seen as an endeavor to think some of Žižek’s writings on music having as a main reference (...) the concept of ontological incompleteness. The philosopher discusses the concept of ontological incompleteness based on several areas, from sciences to movies and literature. Notwithstanding, in this specific case musical examples are left aside. Even though Žižek does not analyse music from the perspective of such concept of ontology, it is possible to argue that Žižek’s writings on music already leave some clues and examples that justify an analysis of that kind. That is the task proposed in this critical essay: to present how an approximation between his thoughts on music and on ontology is pos. (shrink)

En el presente artículo, se examinan y discuten dos argumentos con consecuencias reduccionistas debidos a Jaegwon Kim y a Theodore Sider respectivamente. De acuerdo con el argumento de Kim, la superveniencia fuerte implicaría la coexistencia necesaria de propiedades (es decir, tal y como normalmente se interpreta, la reducción). De acuerdo con el de Sider, ocurriría lo mismo con la superveniencia global. Uno y otro hacen un uso esencial de sendas nociones de propiedad maximal, las cuales son discutidas aquí a la (...) luz de una interpretación natural e interesante de la teoría de las propiedades implícita en sus argumentos. Bajo esta nueva interpretación, en términos modelo-teóricos (véase apartado 4), obtenemos diversas posibilidades de relaciones formales entre las tesis de supervivencia y la reducción, según la lógica utilizada. Al menos bajo una interpretación interesante, los argumentos de Kim y Sider no son correctos, quedando demostrado así que dichos argumentos no son válidos en general. (shrink)

The present paper explores, theoretically, and empirically, whether compliance with the International Code of marketing of breast-milk substitutes impacts on financial performance measured by stock markets. The empirical analysis, which considers a 20-year period, shows that stock markets are indifferent to the level of compliance by manufacturers with the International Code. Two important issues emerge from this result. Based on our finding that financial performance as measured by stock markets cannot explain the level of compliance, the first issue refers to (...) what alternative types of mechanisms drive manufacturers who comply the least with voluntary codes such as the International Code. Conversely, from our finding that stock markets do not reward the most compliant, the second issue raised is an inherent weakness of stock markets to fully incorporate social and environmental values. (shrink)

O presente estudo consiste em uma análise do processo de composição do Timeu-Crítias de Platão, sob o ponto de vista da modelagem do discurso. Pretende-se mostrar que o diálogo é marcado por uma engenhosa articulação de técnicas de composição, que combinam os aspectos pictorial e dramático da mímesis poética. Estabelecendo as Panateneias como referência implícita, a obra apresenta a performance de uma sequência de narrativas, produzidas como verdadeiras imagens discursivas. A originalidade platônica revela-se no Timeu-Crítias, portanto, no desempenho de uma (...) construção formal ao mesmo tempo dramática e imagética, mediante um singular agenciamento mimético de formas do discurso. (shrink)

Resumo: O projeto semântico de Davidson toma a forma de reducionismo que visa explicar as noções intencionais com base em noções puramente extensionais. O objetivo desse trabalho consiste na investigação do fracasso do projeto de Davidson como um argumento indireto contra sua suposição segundo a qual a chamada interpretação radical seria o fundamento do significado linguístico e do pensamento. Abstract: Davidson's semantic program is a form of semantic reductionism that aims to account for intensional notions on a purely extensional basis. (...) My aim in this paper is not to show that Davidsons fails in addressing the so-called extensionality problem. That is no novelty. Even Davidsonians recognize Davidson's failure. My main goal is to explore Davidson's failure as an indirect argument against his key assumption that the radical interpretation is the basis of sense and hence the possibility of thought. There is no priority of language over thought. This is a remnant of the so-called linguistic turn that Davidson inherited from the analytical tradition. The moral is the following: we must come back to Lockean common sense that to learn a natural language and to translate an alien tongue into our own is merely to learn a vehicle for communicating and expressing thoughts we have already had. (shrink)

In the present paper, I try to defend a coherent interpretation of Goodman�s relativism by responding to the main objections of the critics. I also discuss the significance of his pluralism by relating it to the notion of construction. This will show the relevance of Goodman�s philosophy for the present days.

A implementação de tecnologias móveis de informação e comunicação no suporte à Saúde Mental tem atraído a atenção das autoridades. Com a ascensão das Inteligências Artificiais, esse movimento pode ser impulsionado de maneira exponencial. Nesse cenário, esta revisão tem como objetivos verificar a aplicabilidade das Inteligências Artificiais (IAs) na Saúde Mental e analisar os aspectos que favorecem a relação entre IAs e usuários. Para tanto, realizou-se uma revisão sistemática nas bases de dados PubMed e Biblioteca Virtual em Saúde, no período (...) de 25 de maio a 23 de junho de 2023. Selecionamos os 100 primeiros artigos mais relevantes com as palavras-chave: “Inteligência Artificial”, “Saúde Mental”, “Chatbots”, “Psicoterapia”, “Psicologia” e suas equivalentes em inglês. Os critérios de inclusão foram: acesso aberto, publicação a partir de 2018, em português ou inglês e menção à atuação de IAs no âmbito da Saúde Mental. Para reduzir o risco de viés, excluímos os estudos que não mensuraram o impacto das intervenções por meio de métodos experimentais ou quase-experimentais. Para a síntese dos dados, delimitaram-se alguns pontos específicos de análise, como “Resultado da intervenção”, “Aspectos que favorecem a relação”, entre outros. Atenderam aos critérios de inclusão 24 estudos, dos quais 17 apresentaram resultados positivos em suas intervenções. O uso de IAs na Saúde Mental possui grande potencial de expansão e os resultados obtidos neste trabalho podem guiar a implementação dessas práticas e futuras pesquisas na área. (shrink)

This essay aims to expose the metaphysical underpinnings of enactivism. While enactivism relies heavily on rejecting the traditional mind-body problem by excluding the familiar thought experiments that favor phenomenal dualism, the crucial point that is overlooked is instead the brain-body problem, specifically the crucial interaction between the brain and the bodily limbs in their embodied activities of perception and cognition. If enactivism is correct, differences in sensory experience necessarily entail differences in embodied activity—this is the metaphysical core of enactivism, which (...) we think is entirely wrong. We will argue that a physical or biological body ("Körper") is configured or shaped into a perceptually living body ("Leib") by brain patterns and not by embodied activity or by the so-called sensorimotor contingencies. Undoubtedly, embodied actions influence sensory perception. However, since variations in embodied actions do not necessarily lead to variations in sensory experience, they are not metaphysically constitutive of these experiences (supervenience claim). (shrink)

In this essay we will argue for the following theses: 1- know-how is not a form of practical knowledge devoid of propositional sense; 2- the relationship between each perception and the body itself is metaphysically contingent. 3- it is up to the brain to configure or to shape a physical body (Körper) into a living body (Leib) and not the other way around; 4- phenomenal externalism of enactivist nature, even in its mild form, is empirically implausible: the correlation between the (...) conscious character of sensory experience with spatiotemporal neuronal patterns is much more systematic and regular than with anything outside the brain. But in its radical form is entirely implausible and contra-intuitive: phenomenal duplicates are not necessarily duplicates of agency; in short, 5-we are our own brain that has a body, avatars, and artifacts, properly configured and molded by the brain, and not a body that has a brain among other essential organs. (shrink)

Nowadays, on national and international levels, the law has been increasingly considering local and traditional communities’ role for achieving conservation. In Brazil, for instance, one can see how recent legal rules promote benefits for those local groups who practice low environmental impact activities. Nevertheless, regarding traditional fishing communities that live on the coastal zone, a region where many protected areas have been created lately in Brazil, the positive social effects of those measures are often undermined by the economic and political (...) pressure they suffer. This becomes particularly clear when the problem is seen under the different grades of citizenship people face in Brazil: that is, considering how people can be over-included in the legal system to have mainly access to its benefits, while others are under-included to be mainly dependent on it. It seems that Brazilian coastal fishing communities fall into the latter case, and that would explain how they are subject to many different types of restrictions and responsibilities due to the new legal instruments that are being developed to protect such areas, sometimes causing, for instance, a pressure to remove them from their homes. Conservation in this context, then, is to be understood beyond legal texts and, especially, under the evaluation of the social conditions these populations are submitted to. Therefore, this paper sketches the legal development of Brazilian marine protected areas, points out some examples of conflicts involving traditional fishing communities affected by conservation policies, and conceptualizes the relations of over- and under-inclusion they can be considered as part of. (shrink)

The present study is an analysis of Plato’s _Timaeus-Critias_ composition process, from the point of view of discourse modeling. It intends to show that the dialogue is distinguished by an insightful articulation of composition techniques, which combine the pictorial and dramatic aspects of poetic _mimesis_. Establishing the Panateneias as an implicit reference, the work presents the performance of a sequence of narratives, produced as true discursive images. Platonic originality is revealed in _Timaeus-Critias_, therefore, as the accomplishment of a formal construction (...) that is both dramatic and representational, through a singular mimetic agency of discursive forms. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a new nonconceptual reading of the B-Deduction. As Hanna correctly remarks (Int J Philos Stud 19(3):399–415, 2011: 405), the word “cognition” (Erkenntnis/cognition) has, in both editions of the first Critique, a wide sense, meaning nonconceptual cognition, and a narrow meaning, in Kant’s own words “an objective perception” (A320/B377). To be sure, Kant assumes the first meaning to account for why the Deduction is unavoidable. If we take this meaning as a premise of the B-Deduction, then (...) there is a gap in the argument since the categories are certainly not conditions for non-conceptual cognition (Kantian nonconceptualism). Still, I believe it is not this wide meaning but rather the narrow one that figures in any premise of the B-Deduction. Thus, in the reading that I am proposing, categories are not conditions for representing something (I call this the intentionality thesis), or even conditions for representing something objectively (I call this the objectivity thesis). Instead, they are conditions for the recognition that what we represent through the senses exists mind-independently. In the first step of the B-Deduction, this cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of propositional thinking (transcendental apperception) that the nonconceptually represented object of the sensible intuition exists objectively. In contrast, in the second step of the B-Deduction, this cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of the apprehension (figurative synthesis) of what our human senses represent nonconceptually as existing objectively. (shrink)

Pensar a técnica e a tecnologia com Álvaro Vieira Pinto: contribuições para o ensino da filosofia no ensino médio profissional Resumo: Este artigo apresenta uma análise do processo de fabricação dos conceitos relacionados à técnica e à tecnologia na obra “O conceito de Tecnologia” (Vol. 1) de Álvaro Vieira Pinto. Primeiramente aborda-se os conceitos de máquina e de técnica e o modo como esses conceitos se conectam com o problema do “desenvolvimento” nacional. Em seguida explora-se o problema da ideologização da (...) noção de “era tecnológica” e a relação do conceito de tecnologia com a ideologia dominante. Por fim a partir da metodologia do ensino de filosofia por problemas, propõe caminhos possíveis para a introdução do ensino da filosofia da técnica e da filosofia da tecnologia no ensino médio profissional. Palavras-chave: Álvaro Vieira Pinto; Filosofia da Tecnologia; Ensino Médio Profissional; Filosofia Brasileira. Thinking about technique and technology with Álvaro Vieira Pinto: contributions to the teaching of philosophy in Technical High School Abstract: This paper analyzes the conceptualization of techcnique and technology in the book “The Concept of Technology” (Vol.1) of Álvaro Vieira Pinto. The first section focus on the concepts of machine and technique and the connections with the “national developlment problem” in Vieira Pinto work. Then the text explores the ideological treatment of the concept of “Technological Era” and the relationship between technology and dominant ideology. In the end, guided by the methodology of teaching philosophy through problems, the last section proposes some paths to introduce the philosophy of technique and techonology in the practice of teaching Philosophy in the Technical High School. Key-words: Álvaro Vieira Pinto; Philosophy of Technology; Technical High School; Brazilian Philosophy. Penser la technique et la technologie avec Álvaro Vieira Pinto : contributions à l'enseignement de la philosophie dans l'enseignement technique secondaire Résumé: Cet article présente une analyse de les méthodes de fabrication de concepts liés à la technique et à la technologie dans l'ouvrage « Le concept de la Technologie » (Vol. 1) d'Álvaro Vieira Pinto. D’abord, les concepts de machine et de technique sont discutés, ainsi que la manière dont ces concepts sont liés au problème du « développement national». Ensuite, les problèmes de l'idéologisation de la notion d'« âge technologique » et de la relation du concept de technologie avec l'idéologie dominante sont explorés. Enfin, à partir de la méthodologie de l'enseignement de la philosophie par problèmes, on propose des pistes possibles pour introduire la philosophie de la technique et la philosophie de la technologie dans l'enseignement secondaire technique. Mots-clés: Álvaro Vieira Pinto; Philosophie de la Technologie; Enseignement Secondaire Technique; Philosophie Brésilienne. Data de registro: 13/10/2021 Data de aceite: 15/03/2022. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to discuss Mill’s notions of logic and argument and to highlight the epistemic dimension that for Mill has every argument and that, it is in the light of this epistemic dimension, that an argument should be assessed. By taking into account these considerations, I focus on his criticism against deductive arguments to the effect that they commit the fallacy of begging the question. I try to show that this idea relies on his radical empiricism (...) and argue that he is wrong. He particularly fails to recognize how we can gain knowledge from deductive arguments, though their conclusions are already contained in the premises. Finally, I point out the fact that, by his insisting in the epistemic dimension of arguments, Mill’s ideas are closer to those of argumentative theorists. (shrink)

This paper is both systematic and historical in nature. From a historical viewpoint, I aim to show that to establish Wittgenstein’s claim that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” (PI §580) there is an enthymeme in Wittgenstein’s private language argument (henceforth PLA) overlooked in the literature, namely Wittgenstein’s suggestion that both perceptual and bodily experiences are transparent in the relevant sense that one cannot point to a mental state and wonder “What is that?” From a systematic viewpoint, (...) I aim to show that Wittgenstein’s PLA teaches us that the prevailing picture of the nature of phenomenal concepts (henceforth PCs) is upside down: we can only introspectively know what is going on inside our heads after we learn of what is going on outside (PI §580). In this regard, I aim to defend two associate claims against the prevailing view of PCs on the basis of PLA. First, by means of transparency, I aim to show that there is no de re awareness of our private sensation that could determine the meaning of sensation words; for example, I am never aware of the phenomenal blueness of my experience of something blue. The second associated claim is that introspective self-knowledge of our private sensations is always de dicto. We can only know introspectively that phenomenal blueness is the phenomenal character of the experience we are undergoing after we have learned that (de dicto knowledge) blue is the color that usually causes us that kind of experience. Likewise, we can only introspectively know that pain is the phenomenal character of the experience we are undergoing after we have learned that pain is what usually causes some typical pain behavior. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende ofrecer una visión alternativa tanto de la lectura conceptualista tradicional de Kant como de la nueva lectura no conceptualista. En contra de las lecturas conceptualistas tradicionales sostengo que confunden las condiciones para la representación sensible de los objetos (tesis de la intencionalidad) con las condiciones para el reconocimiento (Erkenntnis) de que representamos objetos mediante intuiciones sensibles (tesis del reconocimiento). En contra de las lecturas no conceptualistas sostengo que no distinguen el no conceptualismo -propio de la filosofía contemporánea (...) de la mente- de las tesis antiintelectualistas de Kant. Tales lecturas fracasan porque se equivocan al atribuir un contenido representacional a las intuiciones sensibles de Kant. Las intuiciones sensibles, según Kant, no presentan el mundo según ciertas condiciones de satisfacción que podrían o no ser satisfechas por el mundo. Por lo tanto, no son ni verídicas ni non verídicas. Se limitan a presentar el mundo de una manera directa, independiente de los conceptos, lo que llamaré aquí la presentación de re de los objetos. En mi lectura, la oposición entre intuiciones y conceptos es la oposición entre la presentación de re de um objeto y el reconocimento proposicional de dicto de que representamos algo como um objeto. (shrink)

Kant was never satisfied with the version of his “Refu- tation” published in 1787 (KrV, B 275-279). His dissatisfaction is already evident in the footnote added to the preface of the second edition of the Critique in 1787. As a matter of fact, Kant continued to rework his argument for at least six years after 1787. The main exegetical problem is to figure out who is the target of the “Refutation”: a non-skeptic idealist, a global skeptic of Cartesian provenance or (...) both. In this last case, the related problem is to know whether either of them is the Cartesian skeptic of the first Meditation, the idealist skeptic of the second Meditation and first part of the third Meditation, or some other non-skeptic idealist. I present and defend a new reconstruction of Kant’s “Refu- tation” as a successful argument against Mendelssohnian idealism of Cartesian provenance. This defense is based on a simple logical sketch of the proof provided by Dicker but essentially modified in light of Dyck’s insight about Kant’s opponent. How shall I support my reading? First, by appealing to overwhelming textual evidence according to which the proof is of the existence of mind-independent things, showing that Kant’s main opponent is Mendelssohn’s idealism of Cartesian provenance. Finally, I support my reading by showing that Kant’s “Refutation” is doomed to fail against all forms of global skepticism but is quite successful against Mendelssohn’s idealism. (shrink)